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Abstract 
The existing literatures showing that relationship-based transactions would affect company tax 
avoidance, but with few empirical evidences. This paper makes an empirical study on the topic of 
relationship-based transations and corporate tax avoidence, by using the data of manufacturing 
companies from 2008 to 2016, in Chinese A-share listed market, the empirical study shows that the 
more relationship-based transactions with suppliers (clients), the more aggressive company tax 
avoidance, which indicates that the bahavior of company tax avoidance is influenced by business 
strategies. The study also shows that company’s financial decisions may contain selfish motives of 
powerful executives. Further, the study indicates that relationship-based transactions can boost 
company’s propensity for aggressive tax avoidance during fierce market competition. Yet, there are 
varying degrees of diversification in the moderating effects and weakening control rights by senior 
managers. 
Keywords 
relationship-based transactions, control rights of executives, aggressive tax avoidance, relationship 
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1. Introduction 
The quicker development of economy, the more serious of tax problems. By using various kinds of 
tax-avoidance strategies to reduce tax burdens and increase revenues will affect social welfare 
(Weisbach et al., 2002). In the US, company tax avoidance is considered one of the greatest challenges 
for the national tax administration system (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). In recent years, aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies in China have become increasingly popular, resulting in heavy loss of revenues for 
the government (Note 1). Meanwhile, research on factors that influence tax avoidance behaviors shows 
contradictory conclusions with two tax avoidance viewpoints: traditional and agent (Slemrod, 2004; 
Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). 
The traditional tax avoidance viewpoint holds that tax aggressiveness can increase enterprise’s cash 
flow and net income if there are no other costs and risks, or if the cost is not enough to offset the 
income, so company value will be improved accordingly. In contrast, the agent tax avoidance 
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viewpoint takes the benefits of tax avoidance into account. It is also concerned with tax and non-tax 
costs brought by tax avoidance, such as time consumption, earnings restatement, company reputation 
loss, legal proceedings as well as the risk of punishment by the tax authorities. 
Company tax avoidance decisions are not done in an isolated, closed system, as they are in connection 
with other stakeholders or governance systems (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The existing literatures 
show that tax avoidance behavior is also influenced by various characteristics such as equity structure 
and internal controls (McGuire, Wang, & Wilson, 2014; Bauer, 2016). These findings help to enrich 
our understanding of firms’ tax avoidance motivations in academic circles. However, the existing 
researches ignore the phenomenon of firms’ relationship-based transactions, especially in 
manufacturing industry. Some studies show that in emerging and transitional economies, companies 
prefer the relationship-based transactions, in order to achieve the sustainable development, this 
phenomenon is more prominent in China, whose social structure and cultural tradition are 
characteristically orientated towards relationships (Allen et al., 2005). Nevertheless, reliance on 
relationship-based transactions may trigger the “double-edged sword” effect. By using specific 
investment in the relationship, firms can promote a supply chain integration strategy with important 
suppliers (clients) and provide support for each party in the transactions to acquire and consolidate 
long-term competitive advantages (Banerjee et al., 2008). On the other hand, relationship-based 
transactions may also produce unintended consequence of data manipulation and risk of opportunism 
expropriation by insiders (Raman & Shahrur, 2008). Although the influence of relationship-based 
transactions on firms has gained more attention from academic researchers and practitioners, there is 
limited research on how firms’ relationship agreements affect their financial decisions, from the 
perspective of tax avoidance. In this paper, we explore the impact of relationship-based transactions on 
the economy. 
Meanwhile, firms’ tax avoidance behavior affected by relationship-based transactions might be 
restrained by senior managers and influenced by the firms’ internal management. In theory, tax 
avoidance strategies are driven by the degree to which senior managers are averse to comprehensive 
trade-off of benefits, costs and risks. The Upper Echelons Theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), posited 
that decisions by senior managers are influenced by their personal experiences. Therefore, discussions 
on how senior managers’ experiences influence tax avoidance decisions become important issues in 
this research field. Furthermore, the literature is replete with studies (Dyreng et al., 2010; Law & Mills, 
2017) on how executive fixed effects, CEO military experience, among others, support this argument. 
However, scholars have not paid much attention to the characteristics of the firms’ control rights 
allocation from the perspective of senior managers. 
In their pioneering work on company governance, Aghion and Bolton (1992) looked at control rights 
and different kinds of power structures of the firms as the starting points for analyzing executive 
decision performance and efficiency variance. From the perspective of formation mechanism, tax 
avoidance strategy is the direct embodiment of executives’ motivations and behaviors. Furthermore, 
executives’ exposure to the complex and changeable business environment with different power may 
have heterogeneous expectations on company’s operation state and their own interest. These may lead 
them to evaluate the costs and benefits of tax avoidance differently, which will inevitably affect the tax 
avoidance behavior of the firms. Compared with firms in western developed countries, tax avoidance 
strategy of firms in transitional countries will be influenced more by informal governance mechanism 
represented by relationship-based transactions and control power allocation, etc. (Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010). Consequently, the function of relationship-based transactions and executives’ control rights 
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allocation should be taken into consideration when studying tax avoidance strategies of listed Chinese 
companies. 
Hence in this paper, we explore how relationship-based transactions influence a Corporate tax 
avoidance strategy in Chinese manufacturing industry, considering the moderating effect of 
enhancement of executives’ control rights. To the best of our knowledge, research in this area is sparse 
at best and part of the goal of this paper is to help fill that void. This paper first establishes the logical 
framework of “relationship-based transactions—control rights allocation and selfish motivation—firms’ 
tax avoidance strategy”, and then chooses the manufacturing companies in Chinese A-share market 
from 2008 to 2016 as the research samples for empirical analysis. 
 
2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis 
Firstly, accounting system’s ability to operate efficiently is influenced by the institutional environment 
that the company is exposed to. Secondly, a manager’s propensity for tax avoidance is influenced by 
the company’s current governance structure. Finally, the relative equilibrium state can be obtained by 
the joint influence of internal and external incentives (or constraints), which is also the logical theme of 
theoretical deduction in this paper. 
2.1 Relationship-Based Transactions and Corporate Tax Avoidance Behavior 
Due to the limitation of market mechanism and factor market, firms face with extremely high market 
transaction costs in the context of emerging and transitional institution. Consequently, firms prefer 
relationship-based transactions model with its inherent benefits of cooperation, mutual trust, guarding 
against ethics risks and adverse selection behavior (MacLeod, 2007). This strategy is conducive to the 
Chinese culture that is based on relationships, especially in the absence of a strong judicial system that 
can protects the interest of investors. Therefore, as important non-financial stakeholders, relationships 
with suppliers or clients play a crucial role in the financial performance and operating policies of the 
enterprises (Freeman, 2010). In order to encourage supplies to get into long-term contracts, firms need 
to show excellent financial stability. Hence, this paper posits that firms should have strong motivation 
to select and implement more aggressive tax avoidance policies. There are several reasons in support of 
this proposition: 
First, companies with higher degree of relationship-based transactions need more cash to hedge against 
cash flow risk. In practice, businesses are susceptible to unmet contracts and bankruptcies that 
inevitably impact their cash flows, resulting in financial losses. Bates et al. (2009) note that the role of 
cash as a risk management tool will be strengthened if firms realize how suppliers or clients influence 
the safety of their capital chain. Meanwhile, higher cash holding is also a manifestation of the capacity 
to maintain the relationship-specific investment and helps to stabilize the contractual relationships of 
both sides, and thereby avoiding the loss of important suppliers/clients (Itzkowitz, 2013). If there are no 
other costs and risks involved (or costs are not sufficient enough to offset profits), tax avoidance 
behavior can increase the firms’ cash flow and net income by temporary or permanent discrepancy of 
accounting and tax collection difference (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Therefore, in order to prevent 
potential cash flow risks, companies with high degree of relationship-based transactions tend to adopt 
more aggressive tax avoidance strategy.  
Second, companies with higher degree of relationship-based transactions need to deal with higher risk 
of financial dilemma. Dhaliwal et al. (2017) notes that reliance on important suppliers or clients might 
increase the possibility of involvement in future financial distress and auditors are more likely to issue 
continuous operation audit comment for such firms. Exposing a company’s deteriorating financial 
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position may make survivability of their products and services vulnerable. Therefore, suppliers or 
clients may be averse to transacting with them. Yet tax avoidance behavior usually brings economic 
benefits (Higgins et al., 2015), so corporations may use positive tax planning to relieve the worries of 
the trading partners about potential financial risk. For instance, Noga and Schnader (2013) find that 
firms with the propensity to thrive in financial crisis have opportunities to increase their accounting 
profits through aggressive tax avoidance. Hence, in order to reduce adverse effect of financial risk, 
firms with higher degree of relationship-based transactions tend to adopt aggressive tax avoidance 
strategies. 
Moreover, corporations with higher degree of relationship-based transactions have internal motivations 
of presenting excellent performance to suppliers/clients. The closeness of business relationship also 
indicates improvement of mutual interdependence between trading partners. Owing to the 
heterogeneity and inseparability of transactions, higher conversion costs are inevitably incurred due to 
the “binding effect”. Therefore, once the relationship-based transactions is canceled or terminated, the 
asset specificity value of corporations may be greatly affected (Titman, 1984). In order to incentivize 
more suppliers/clients to sign long-term contracts or increase relationship-specific investment, firms are 
inclined to whitewash performance and present flourishing prospect with the use of increasing 
discretionary accruals (Raman & Shahrur, 2008). Further, Wilson et al. (2009) find that corporations 
conduct positive profit management with the use of tax avoidance behavior. Hence, corporations with 
higher degree of relationship-based transactions, driven by the motivation of increasing profits, will 
tend to adopt aggressive avoidance strategy. 
In addition, firms’ willingness to take risk reflect their tax planning orientation to some extent. The 
attitude of senior managers to risk-based tax avoidance activities is a decisive factor for the tax 
avoidance behaviors of the firms. Higgins et al. (2015) holds that company’s risk preference can be 
embodied in operations strategy and tax avoidance strategy and prove with empirical study that firms 
that take risk-type strategy will adopt more aggressive tax avoidance policy. Compared with so-called 
discrete transaction model, increase in relationship-based transactions will lead to increase in the risk 
that the firm will take, and their reliance on suppliers/clients relationship is considered a risk-type 
business strategy by some recent studies (Dhaliwal et al., 2017). Mihov and Naranjo (2017) find that 
firms with more concentrated customer base experience higher idiosyncratic volatility due to the 
transmission of firm-specific shocks in a supply-chain environment. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
firms that have higher risk tolerance threshold with suppliers/clients, will be more inclined to take 
aggressive tax avoidance measures. 
Based on the above analysis, the first research hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: the higher degree of relationship-based transactions between the company and suppliers/clients, the 
more aggressive the tax avoidance behavior of the firms. 
2.2 The Moderating Effect of the Control Rights Allocation 
As an important part of business strategy, reduction of tax expenditures continues to gain the attention 
of senior managers. Given that the conflict between executives and shareholders is becoming 
increasingly keen, powerful executives have greater influence on the tax avoidance strategy of the firm 
and should weigh its benefits and costs from their own utility maximization. Then, how do powerful 
managers influence relationship-based transactions and tax avoidance behavior? 
On one hand, by virtue of their position, power and personal ambitions, executives might strengthen 
relationship-based transactions and aggressive tax avoidance behaviors. This would be especially true 
in a laissez-faire board environment. By engaging in complex and spurious hidden tax avoidance 
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strategies executives could harness more company resources to finance private interests, increase the 
difficulty in supervising stakeholders, reduce the cost and risk of gaining private benefits, and provide 
stable, effective implementation environment and safety assurance (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). By 
means of the “just cause” of maintaining relationship-based transactions and satisfying the needs of 
suppliers or clients, executives can reasonably explain their tax avoidance policies to the board of 
directors. Therefore, tax avoidance behavior is more likely to be used as the “good carrier” for 
rent-seeking. 
Based on the above analysis, some scholars have provided verifiable research findings from the 
principle-agent perspective. Slemrod (2004) finds that executives in an aggressive tax avoidance 
environment might hoard an organization’s capital to protect their self-interest, under the guise of tax 
avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) believe that senior managers without effective supervision 
will adopt aggressive tax avoidance policies and that there exists a complementary relationship 
between aggressive tax avoidance and senior managers’ propensity for power, which will further 
enhance executive’s willingness to engage in tax avoidance transactions. Kang and Ko (2014) think 
that executives will be inclined to engage in aggressive tax avoidance behaviors when motivation 
strategies fail. According to Laguir and Stagliano (2014), more powerful CEOs would implement more 
aggressive tax avoidance strategies in order to enhance personal benefits and control. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the business relationship between firms and suppliers/clients may 
provide the “shield” for seeking private benefits by executives in tax avoidance transactions. 
Furthermore, the enhancement of executives’ control rights will further intensify the facilitation effect 
of relationship-based transactions on aggressive tax avoidance behavior. 
On the other hand, in order to honor contracts with their partners, powerful senior managers may 
exhibit aggressive tax avoidance tendencies. Agent viewpoint of tax avoidance posits that although tax 
avoidance activities can bring direct and considerable economical benefit, they also increase the cost of 
tax collection and non-tax related costs such as for waste of time, reduction in employee morale, loss of 
reputation, inspection risk of supervising officers and rent-seeking of the executives for the firms and 
managers (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The stability of business relations reinforces the consistency of 
the objectives and actions of both transaction parties and improves the degree of mutual checks and 
balances between the two parties. However, investment in certain assets might entail the following 
value judgments: to avoid loss of reputational capital caused by low credit ratings, firms have a 
long-term motivation and need to comply with the terms of their contracts and will not jeopardize their 
partner’s interest by engaging in selfish behaviors. The current study shows that improvement in 
company governance can effectively alleviate doubts in stakeholders on the rent-seeking of the insiders 
in tax avoidance transactions (Wilson, 2009), and suppliers/clients will positively evaluate the tax 
avoidance behavior by such firms (Li et al., 2017). 
It is predictable that once the rent-seeking motivation of executives in tax avoidance behavior is 
exposed, it is equal to transmitting the information that the firm enjoys poor reputation to the other 
stakeholders. Therefore, the suppliers/clients may view the embedded informal governance mechanism 
represented by powerful executives as the hindrance of company governance efficiency, and will 
evaluate negatively on the motivation and value effect of tax avoidance behavior, which will inevitably 
reduce the investment willingness of relationship-specific assets and increase the relationship 
governance costs. In order to eliminate hidden dangers, maintain and strengthen relationship-specific 
investment of the firms, powerful executives might take the giving-up of the aggressive tax avoidance 
behavior as a “believable promise” given to their business partners. At this time, the control rights of 
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the executives might play a negative moderating role in the relationship between relationship-based 
transactions and tax avoidance behavior. 
Based on the above analyses, the paper hypothesizes that for firms that rely on relationship-based 
transactions, it is hard to judge the enhancement of control rights of executives is the presentation of 
rent-seeking motivations of power or the “signal effect” produced under the governance of relation 
contract. Although there is no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, it is expected to have 
significant influence. Therefore, we will not make directional judgments, but put forward the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: The enhancement of control rights of executives can facilitate positive relations between 
relationship-based transactions and aggressive tax avoidance.  
H2b: The enhancement of executives’ control rights can weaken the positive relations between 
relationship-based transactions and aggressive tax avoidance. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
Since China implemented new Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises in 2007 and new 
Enterprise Income Tax System in 2008, this paper selected China’s A-share listed manufacturing 
corporations from 2008 to 2016 as the initial samples. We selected manufacturing industry as the 
research objects because the relationship between their suppliers/clients is more stable, therefore more 
conducive for observing the impact of relationship-based transactions on a corporate tax avoidance 
policies. The initial data was then pruned by deleting ST and PT samples; samples whose auditing 
opinions are “refusal” or “denial”; samples with income tax expense of 0≤ in that year is less than or 
equal to zero; and samples with incomplete data. The pruning process resulted in a final sample size of 
6,174 (for suppliers’ relationship transactions) and 7,302 (for clients’ relationship transactions), 
respectively. The research data of company governance and financial information are mainly taken 
from CSMAR and WIND databases, with random sampling used for cross verification of the firms’ 
annual reports. We winsorize the main continuous variables at the top and bottom 1% in the regression 
analysis to mitigate the influence of extreme observations. 
3.2 Variable Definitions 
3.2.1 Relationship-Based Transaction (RBT) 
When the purchase and sales of the firms rely much on several trading partners, indicating that the 
corporations have relatively higher level of assets specificity to these important suppliers/clients. Based 
on the study of Mihov and Naranjo (2017) and combined with the relevant information revealed in the 
actual disclosure of the annual reports of China’s listed firms, the paper adopts the purchase proportion 
of the top five suppliers RBT_Supply or the top five clients RBT_Customer as the substitution 
variables of the degree of relationship-based transactions. Banerjee et al. (2008) believe that this 
method is more reasonable when measuring the relationship-based transactions between the firms and 
the suppliers/clients. 
3.2.2 Control Rights Allocation of Executives (POWER) 
The executives’ control rights are the authority or ability that core executives such as CEOs have, 
which can play a crucial role in the decision-making and implementation of a firms’ important events. 
Although there are several methods used to measure the control rights of executives, there is no direct 
measurement index. Based on Finkelstein (1992)’s power model and the method proposed by Dai and 
Peng (2015), this paper describes the characteristics of control rights of senior managers from the 
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following eight aspects:  
① The managerial structure: If CEOs occupy important position on the board of directors, their 
influence will be greater. So this index is assigned a value of 0 when the CEO does not serve on the 
board, and a value of 1 or 2 if they serve as director or the chairman of the board. 
② The shareholding of CEOs: CEO who holds shares owns an “amphibious identity” of both 
shareholder and administrator, which is conducive to playing a more crucial role in the 
decision-making of important events of the firms. This index is assigned a value of 1 if CEO holds 
shares, and 0 if not.  
③ The board size: Some scholars find that the executives’ control rights are positively correlated with 
the size of the board of directors (Morse et al., 2011). The index takes the median of the industry as the 
standard, and is assigned a value of 1 when the number of directors is larger than the median, otherwise 
it is 0. 
④ Independent directors’ capacity of performing duties: It is generally believed that the shorter the 
distance between the independent director and the place where the firm is registered, the more 
convenient he is able to perform supervisory duties, weaken and constrain the rights of the executives. 
This index is assigned a value of 1 if the location of the independent director is different from that of 
the company’s place of registration, otherwise it is 0. 
⑤ Higher educational degree and higher professional title (Note 2): Finkelstein (1992) points out that 
highly educated senior managers or executives with high professional titles can exert personal 
influence on important firm decisions by using their professional reputation more easily. This index is 
assigned a value of 1 when the CEO is highly educated or has a high professional title, otherwise it is 0. 
⑥  CEO tenure: With the accumulation of work time, executives can more easily establish 
consolidated “profit sharing” alliance in the organization by means of “appointment and removal of the 
official positions”. This index takes the median of the industry as the standard, and is assigned a value 
of 1 when the CEO tenure is longer than the median, otherwise it is 0. 
⑦ Holding part-time positions in other firms: If the administrator has part-time position in other firms, 
he/she has wider social relationship network, and this helps to win more discourse rights in making the 
company’s strategic policies. This index is assigned a value of 1 when the CEO has a part-time position 
in other firms, otherwise it is 0. 
⑧ CEO’s political connections: Researchers generally believe that executives who have closer 
relationship with the government will possess “entrenchment effect” inside the firm, and further hinder 
the well running of the governance mechanism of the firm (Cao et al., 2017). This index is assigned a 
value of 1 when the CEO has political connection (Note 3), otherwise it is 0. 
The above eight aspects describe the attributes and characteristics of the control rights of the executives 
from different dimensions, yet if we study these eight aspects individually, it will be very difficult to 
make an accurate and unbiased measurement. Following the method of Dai and Peng (2015), the paper 
makes a synthetic treatment to these eight aspects of the control rights of the executives by using the 
following two ways, and finally gets one comprehensive variable: 1) a comprehensive indicator: 
POWER_avg. is generated from the mean of the eight characteristics dimensions, 2) using Principle 
Components Analysis, a principle component score is calculated from the eight characteristics 
dimensions and used to generate a comprehensive indicator POWER_pca. According to the principle of 
indicator construction, the greater the POWER value, the stronger the executives’ control rights. 
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3.2.3 Degree of Aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) 
One of the three generally used methods for measuring tax avoidance behavior is the effective tax rate. 
However, because China’s tax collection policy is complicated, firms usually enjoy wide tax collection 
privileges. Therefore, nominal tax rate is different, which makes it difficult to make horizontal 
comparison between the samples, and to measure the degree of subjective tax avoidance of the firms. 
Another popular method is the accountant-tax collection difference. However, this indicator is 
susceptible to the influence of earnings management and is also difficult to make effective division 
from the indicators (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Lastly, there is the fixed effect residual method 
proposed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). This method uses the accountant-tax collection difference, 
after deduction of accrued profit, to measure the degree of tax avoidance of the firm. It is generally 
believed that this method can measure and reflect the aggressive tax avoidance behavior of the firms 
more correctly. In this paper, we adopt with the following calculation formula: 
tiititi TACCBTD ,,1,                               （1） 
Where, BTD=tax burden difference/total assets, tax burden difference=pre-tax accounting 
profit—(income tax expense/nominal tax rate); TACC=(net profit–net amount of operating cash 
flow)/total assets; and the term μi+εi,t  measures the degree of aggressive tax avoidance of the 
corporations, TA. The bigger the TA, the more severe is the corporation’s aggressive tax avoidance 
behavior. 
3.3 Model Design 
The paper uses the following models to examine the relationship among relationship-based transactions, 
control rights allocation and aggressive tax avoidance.  




YearIndAGEGROWTHSIZE
INTANPPESOELEVROARBTTA
ttt
ttttttt
987
6543210
     （2） 




YearIndAGEGROWTHSIZEINTANPPE
SOELEVROAPOWERRBTPOWERRBTTA
ttttt
ttttttt
1110987
6543210 （3） 
In models (2) and (3), the dependent variable, TA, is the aggressive tax collection agent variable, and 
RBT is the strength of relationship-based transactions, according to Dyreng et al. (2010) and Kang and 
Ko (2014). This paper also sets the following control variables: ROA (profitability), LEV (financial 
leverage), SOE (property nature), PPE (fixed assets ratio), INTAN (intangible assets ratio), SIZE 
(enterprise scale), GROWTH (growth) and AGE (listed years). Additionally, the model includes 
dummy variables of industry and year. 
If H1 is valid, i.e., the relationship-based transactions can facilitate aggressive tax avoidance behavior, 
and then the regression coefficient of RBT in model (2) should be significantly positive. The cross term 
RBT×POWER is used to examine H2a (H2b): if the regression coefficient is significantly positive, 
indicating that control rights of the executives play positive moderating effect in the relationship 
between relationship-based transactions and the tax avoidance behavior. Otherwise, the enhancement 
of control rights of the executives weakens the influence that relationship-based transactions have on 
tax avoidance behavior. The specific definitions and methods used to calculate the variables are listed 
below: 
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Table 1. The Definitions and Calculation of Variables 
Types of 
Variables 
Names of Variables 
Symbols of 
Variables 
Definition or Calculating Method of Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Tax avoidance degree TA See the calculating methods in this paper 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Relationship-based 
transaction 
RBT_Supply 
Purchases from top five suppliers/total annual 
purchases 
RBT_Customer Sales to top five clients/total annual sales 
Control rights 
allocation 
POWER_avg 
Comprehensive indicator of equally weighted 
average of executive’s control rights 
POWER_pca 
Comprehensive indicator of principal component 
of control rights; According to the principle that 
latent root should be greater than 1, the top four 
principal components are chosen to calculate the 
comprehensive scores 
Control 
Variables 
Profitability ROA Net profit/Average total assets 
Financial leverage LEV Total liabilities/average total assets 
Property rights nature SOE 
If it is a stated-owned enterprise, it is 1, otherwise 
it is 0 
Fixed assets ratio PPE Net fixed assets/average total assets 
Intangible assets ratio INTAN Net intangible assets/average total assets 
Enterprise scale SIZE Natural logarithm of average total assets 
Growth GROWTH Growth rate of operating revenue 
Listed years AGE Natural logarithm after adding 1 to the listed age 
Industry Ind 
Sets industry dummy variables based on the 
secondary classification of CSRC for 
manufacturing industry 
Year Year Dummy variable of years 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of Table 2 shows that the means of the relationship-based transactions 
RBT_Supply and RBT_Customer variable are 0.354 and 0.299, respectively. This is indication that 
manufacturing firms in China prefer to make relationship-based transactions with important suppliers 
(clients) and depend highly on them. The numerical values of the variables control rights of the 
executives’ POWER_avg and POWER_pca are basically consistent in statistical form, and a bit higher 
than that of the statistical result of Dai and Peng (2015). This indicates that the control rights of the 
executives of the listed Chinese firms show a steady rise in recent years. In terms of the statistical 
results of other variables, the mean of ROA is 0.043, a relatively lower numerical value. This is an 
indication that the profit-gaining capability of the manufacturing firms needs to be improved. The 
comparison of the numerical values of PPE and INTAN proves that these firms emphasize the fixed 
assets investment and ignore light invisible assets investment. The mean of GROWTH 0.204 is high, 
yet the growth rates of about 1/4 of the firms have not reached 1%. Besides, the 25% quantile and 75% 
quantile of each variable indicate that with respect to relationship-based transactions and characteristics 
of the control rights and degrees of tax avoidance, there exists relatively strong heterogeneity features 
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among the firms in our sample. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variable 
Names 
Symbol 
Number of 
Samples 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
25% 
Quantile
Median 
75% 
Quantile 
Degree of tax 
avoidance 
TA 7302 0.000 0.051 -0.022 0.007 0.029 
Relationship-bas
ed transaction 
RBT_Supply 6174 0.354 0.209 0.220 0.315 0.483 
RBT_Customer 7302 0.299 0.198 0.147 0.244 0.396 
Control rights 
allocation 
POWER_avg 7302 0.508 0.186 0.375 0.500 0.625 
POWER_pca 7302 0.000 0.479 -0.259 0.024 0.271 
Profitability ROA 7302 0.043 0.064 0.017 0.039 0.070 
Financial 
leverage 
LEV 7302 0.507 0.211 0.367 0.513 0.627 
Property rights 
nature 
SOE 7302 0.593 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Rate of fixed 
assets 
PPE 7302 0.327 0.185 0.177 0.294 0.420 
Rate of invisible 
assets 
INTAN 7302 0.044 0.053 0.014 0.032 0.056 
Scale of firms SIZE 7302 21.502 1.069 20.730 21.481 22.299 
Growth GROWTH 7302 0.204 0.407 0.008 0.159 0.334 
Listed years AGE 7302 2.478 0.708 2.198 2.641 2.902 
 
Table 3 gives the univariate analysis results of relationship-based transactions, control rights allocation 
and aggressive tax avoidance behavior. It is found that either using RBT_Supply or using 
RBT_Customer to measure relationship-based transactions, the means and medians are higher in the 
high relationship transaction group than those in low relationship transaction group. Meanwhile, this 
paper further divides high relationship transaction groups according to the strengths and weaknesses of 
the control rights of executives. The test results show that compared with weak control right group, 
indicators of tax avoidance degree are higher in strong control rights group. This indicates that the 
strength of control rights of executives might produce “enhancement” effect between 
relationship-based transactions and tax avoidance behavior. Thus, firms that depend on relationships 
have more aggressive tax avoidance policies that are influenced by powerful executives. These findings 
verify H1 and H2a of this paper. 
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Table 3. Relationship-Based Transaction, Control Rights Allocation and Tax Avoidance: 
Univariate Analysis 
RBT=RBT_Supply 
 Number of Samples Mean Median
T value of 
T-test 
Z value of 
Wilcoxon-test
High relationship transaction group 3071 0.013 0.014 
3.04*** 2.67*** 
Low relationship transaction group 3103 -0.012 -0.011 
High relationship 
transaction group 
Strong control 
rights group 
1274 0.016 0.017 
2.29** 2.11** 
Weak control 
rights group 
1797 0.008 0.010 
RBT=RBT_Customer 
 Number of samples Mean Median
T value of 
T-test 
Z value of 
Wilcoxon-test
High relationship transaction group 3632 0.011 0.012 
2.70*** 2.27** 
Low relationship transaction group 3670 -0.010 -0.011 
High relationship 
transaction group 
Strong control 
rights group 
1505 0.013 0.015 
2.16** 1.81* 
Weak control 
rights group 
2127 0.008 0.010 
Notes. Taking example of the secondary classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) about the manufacturing industry, this paper regards the samples whose values of RBT and 
POWER_avg are higher than the medians of the industry as the high relationship transaction group and 
strong control rights group. Means and medians are both corresponding values of the tax avoidance 
variable TA, and make T test and Wilcoxon sum test respectively. ***, **, * indicate that the test is 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In univariate analysis, we only adopt the method of dividing the groups by using dummy variables to 
describe the characteristics of relationship-based transactions and control rights allocation. This neither 
can study the different function mechanism owned by the variables accurately, clarify the coupling 
effects among the variables, nor can it to control the other factors to have potential impact on tax 
avoidance policies. Therefore, further regression analysis should be made to have more reliable 
verification. 
The regression results on H1 are presented in Table 4. From the test results of rank 1 and rank 2, the 
regression coefficients of RBT are significantly positive and significant at the 1% level, regardless of 
whether RBT_Supply or RBT_Customer was used to measure relationship-based transactions. That is, 
the higher the degree of relationship-based transactions, the more serious is the aggressive tax 
avoidance, showing that the specific investment of the firms in establishing relationship with the 
suppliers (clients) really boosts the aggressive tax avoidance policies of the firms. This finding is 
consistent with Li et al. (2017), showing that in the context of governance of listed Chinese firms, those 
that rely on relationship for their transactions are more likely to choose aggressive tax avoidance 
behavior for mitigating the risks of future cash flow, maintaining or attracting more 
relationship-specific investments. 
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However, it should be noted that relationship-based transactions firms and their suppliers (clients) will 
be restrained by future transaction expectation and present a state of high dependence (Raman & 
Shahrur, 2008). And, that a company’s aggressive tax avoidance behavior brings direct economic 
benefit, yet it might produce an unwanted “side effect” of loss of prestige or even lawsuit. Hence, a 
Corporate tax avoidance behavior might affect relationship-specific investment for the suppliers 
(clients). That is, the regression model might interact with endogenous problems and to a certain degree, 
lead to estimation error. 
Therefore, this paper used Two-Stage Least Squares method (2SLS) to solve the endogeneity problem. 
It is widely believed that there is a strong correlation between relationship-based transactions, RBT, 
and industry attributes. However, it is difficult for tax avoidance index, TA, to influence industry 
median of the RBT variable. Following the above principle, this paper uses the median of RBT_Supply 
and RBT_Customer as the key variable of RBT for the purpose of alleviating endogeneity concerns. 
Results of the 2SLS regression are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. After considering potential 
endogeneity problems, it is found that the empirical results are consistent with columns (1) and (2) in of 
the table. This consistency could be explained by the fact that the regression coefficient of 
relationship-based transaction variable RBT is still significantly positive. Thus, it can be concluded that 
there are no endogeneity problems because of the stability and reliability of the results of regressions (1) 
and (2) in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Regression Results of H1 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable=TA 
Regression (1) Regression (2)
2SLS 
Regression (3) Regression (4) 
RBT_Supply 
0.012*** 
(4.49) 
 
0.018*** 
(5.77) 
 
RBT_Customer  
0.008*** 
(3.46) 
 
0.013*** 
(4.75) 
ROA 
0.107*** 
(3.24) 
0.104*** 
(3.11) 
0.071*** 
(2.69) 
0.081*** 
(2.87) 
LEV 
-0.078*** 
(-4.29) 
-0.079*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.062*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.057** 
(-2.33) 
SOE 
-0.006** 
(-2.28) 
-0.006** 
(-2.23) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.65) 
PPE 
0.047*** 
(3.09) 
0.050*** 
(3.27) 
0.077*** 
(4.53) 
0.076*** 
(4.03) 
INTAN 
0.032 
(1.42) 
0.029 
(1.37) 
0.046 
(1.30) 
0.047 
(1.34) 
SIZE 
0.011** 
(2.09) 
0.013** 
(2.21) 
0.022*** 
(2.74) 
0.024*** 
(2.79) 
GROWTH 
0.007*** 
(2.56) 
0.007*** 
(2.63) 
0.005** 
(2.28) 
0.005** 
(2.16) 
AGE 
0.003* 
(1.79) 
0.003* 
(1.67) 
0.005** 
(2.06) 
0.006** 
(2.08) 
Constant -0.089*** -0.082*** -0.113*** -0.108*** 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp              Journal of Business Theory and Practice               Vol. 6, No. 4, 2018 
286 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
(-5.04) (-4.43) (-6.25) (-6.07) 
Year and 
Industry 
Control Control Control Control 
Adj.R2 0.151 0.148 0.124 0.119 
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sample Size 6174 7302 6174 7302 
Note. The value in the brackets are the T value of regression coefficient, which have controlled the 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems after the White (1980) robustness correctness and 
Cluster adjustment; ***, **, * respectively indicating the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level (two 
tailed test). 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5, the regression results of H2 using POWER_avg or POWER_pca to 
measure executive control rights characteristics, the regression coefficients of RBT×POWER variables 
are positively significant at the 10% level. This indicates that enhancement of executive control rights 
can further strengthen positive relation between relationship-based transactions and company 
aggressive tax avoidance behaviors. Correspondingly, H2a proposed in this paper is also confirmed. On 
the basis of the above evidence, it is shown that under the realistic background of the increasingly 
hidden executive rent-seeking methods, powerful executives tend to start from the principle of 
maximum of its own utility so as to conduct self-interest manipulation on financial decisions. Moreover, 
they have also implemented more aggressive tax avoidance behaviors under the guise of “right reasons” 
inclusive of maintaining business relationships and meeting suppliers’ (clients’) expectations. 
Meanwhile, it also indicates that the relationship governance mechanism which is formed for adhering 
to the commercial transactions may not present the expected “reveres transmission effect” under the 
disturbance of powerful executives. The possible explanations are pointed out in the followings: on the 
one hand, executives will make a comprehensive trade-off between selfish tax avoidance behavior and 
company governance signal transmission. With the constant consolidation of control rights, the back 
feeding effect between tax avoidance and rent-seeking is more and more significant, and the profits 
derived from tax avoidance are increased correspondingly. On the other hand, relationship-based 
transactions weaken the company’s willingness to disclose for public scrutiny as well as reduce the 
degree of transparency of the firm (Ball et al., 2000). This would increase the oversight difficulties for 
stakeholders such as trading partners, investors and taxation authority, etc. on tax avoidance behaviors. 
In addition, with the accomplishment of share reform, the frequent reduction of non-tradable shares 
makes the shareholding structure of the listed companies disperse, which will naturally and further 
increase the degree of insider control. In this case, the possibility that the executives’ would betray or 
sacrifice shareholders’ interests for the purpose of pursuing self-interests will increase accordingly. 
Based on the emerging and transitional realities, this finding suggests that we should take into 
consideration, the possible impact on management decisions caused by internal power allocation when 
we study economic consequences of relationship-based transactions of the listed Chinese companies. 
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Table 5. Regression Results of H2 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable=TA 
POWER=POWER_avg POWER=POWER_pca 
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4)
RBT_Supply 
0.006** 
(2.32) 
 
0.004* 
(1.77) 
 
RBT_Customer  
0.005** 
(2.20) 
 
0.005* 
(1.91) 
RBT_Supply×POWER 
0.014*** 
(3.03) 
 
0.019*** 
(2.46) 
 
RBT_Customer×POWER  
0.012*** 
(2.92) 
 
0.015** 
(2.13) 
POWER 
0.008* 
(1.77) 
0.009* 
(1.83) 
0.009* 
(1.66) 
0.012** 
(2.08) 
ROA 
0.091*** 
(2.69) 
0.086*** 
(2.73) 
0.072** 
(2.02) 
0.101*** 
(3.17) 
LEV 
-0.085*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.098*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.089*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.093*** 
(-4.21) 
SOE 
-0.007** 
(-2.36) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.008** 
(-2.31) 
-0.008** 
(-2.30) 
PPE 
0.032*** 
(2.79) 
0.036*** 
(3.01) 
0.040*** 
(3.34) 
0.039*** 
(3.26) 
INTAN 
-0.004 
(-0.76) 
-0.002 
(-0.57) 
0.011 
(1.13) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
SIZE 
0.015** 
(2.04) 
0.016** 
(2.12) 
0.010* 
(1.78) 
0.019*** 
(2.51) 
GROWTH 
0.012** 
(2.14) 
0.011* 
(1.89) 
0.013** 
(2.18) 
0.012* 
(1.73) 
AGE 
0.003* 
(1.68) 
0.003 
(1.52) 
0.004* 
(1.70) 
0.004* 
(1.67) 
Constant 
-0.119*** 
(-5.92) 
-0.108*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.101*** 
(-5.37) 
-0.104*** 
(-5.29) 
Year and Industry Control Control Control Control 
Adj.R2 0.181 0.164 0.160 0.154 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sample Size 6174 7302 6174 7302 
Note. The value in the brackets are the T value of regression coefficient, which have controlled the 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems after the White (1980) robustness correctness and 
Cluster adjustment; ***, **, * respectively indicating the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level (two 
tailed test). 
 
To sum up, H1 and H2a in this paper are supported by empirical evidence. In addition, according to the 
regression results of control variables in Tables 4 and 5, it can be concluded that if the profitability of 
the company is stronger, the fixed assets ratio is higher, the enterprise scale is larger, the growth is 
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better and the listed time of the company is longer, the more aggressive the firms’ tax avoidance 
behavior. However, the excessively high financial leverage and the attributes of state-owned 
shareholders hinder aggressive tax avoidance, which is consistent with the relevant studies. 
4.3 Further Studies 
4.3.1 The Impact of Market Competition Pressure and Degree of Diversification 
This study has shown that dependence on relationship-based transactions intensifies aggressive tax 
avoidance behaviors of the firm. Additionally, powerful executives play significant roles in promoting 
this relationship. Thus, of interest is how internal and external governance characteristics of enterprises 
affect this relationship? Combined with relevant domestic and global studies, this paper discusses only 
the possible effects of governance from the perspectives of competitive market pressures and 
diversified operation. 
Adopting the methods described in the existing research (Darius & Korzynski, 2017), this paper uses 
Lerner Index and Income Entropy Index to portray the market competition and degree of diversification 
respectively. Specifically, Lerner Index=(revenue-cost-management costs-sale cost)/revenue, which 
indicates that the smaller the index, the greater is the market competition pressure. Income Entropy 
Index=∑Pi×ln(1/Pi), among which Pi refers to the proportion of the industry i in the total income of the 
enterprise. And the greater the index, the higher is the degree of diversification. Based on this, and in 
order to discuss changes in the research conclusions in different situation and degree of diversification, 
we choose the industry medians (Note 4) of Lerner Index and Income Entropy Index as the criteria. 
Following this, the sample enterprises are divided into “strong/weak market competition group” and 
“high/low diversification group”. In addition, the re-regression of models (2) and (3) is carried out on 
the basis of the above sub samples, and then the significance test was carried out to measure the group 
differences in the regression coefficients of the tested variables using Chow-test. 
According to the regression results in Table 6 (Note 5), when the firm is faced with bigger market 
competition pressure and is endowed with lower degree of diversification, the RBT_Supply variable 
has greater regression coefficient and the difference is significant at the 10% level. However, the 
regression coefficient of cross term RBT_Supply×POWER_avg doesn’t pass the significant difference 
test. The results show that with the strengthening of market competition and improvement of an 
enterprise’s degree of specialized operation, the promoting effect of relationship-based transactions on 
the aggressive tax avoidance behaviors is more significant while the positive moderating effect of the 
executives’ control rights obviously weakens. 
For these results, the paper makes the following analyses. Market competition pressure of the enterprise 
will reduce the switching cost of suppliers/clients. In this case, the trading model established on the 
relationship contract, an informal governance mechanism, is more fragile. It is easier for the future cash 
flow risk of the firm to be increased owing to adjustments by important suppliers/clients. Therefore, 
firms hope to change their unfavorable situation through aggressive tax avoidance behaviors. However, 
under pressure from the external environment, powerful executives may “restrain” the power 
rent-seeking motives when making tax avoidance decisions. Similarly, when the specialization degree 
of the firm is relatively high, reliance and dependence of the enterprise on key partners are further 
intensified because of relatively single source of income. Then the bargaining power of important 
suppliers/clients is increasing accordingly, which makes it more difficult for the firm to 
correspondingly maintain the relationship contracts. Therefore, firms with specialized operations are 
motivated to choose aggressive tax avoidance behaviors, and powerful executives may stabilize the 
willingness of transaction partners to adopt relationship-specific investment by reducing tax 
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aggressiveness with powerful suppliers (clients). 
 
Table 6. The Impact of Market Competition and Diversification 
Independent Variable 
Groups divided according to market competition degree Groups divided according to diversification degree 
Strong Weak Strong Weak High Low High Low 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
(6) 
Regression 
(7) 
Regression 
(8) 
RBT_Supply 
0.013*** 
(4.82) 
0.006* 
(1.79) 
0.010*** 
(2.58) 
0.003* 
(1.67) 
0.006** 
(2.03) 
0.012*** 
(4.01) 
0.005* 
(1.73) 
0.008** 
(2.33) 
RBT_Supply×POWER_avg   
0.006 
(1.41) 
0.009* 
(1.74) 
  
0.008* 
(1.65) 
0.005 
(1.32) 
POWER_avg   
0.004* 
(1.66) 
0.006* 
(1.75) 
  
0.003* 
(1.64) 
0.005* 
(1.72) 
ROA 
0.062** 
(2.30) 
0.131*** 
(4.11) 
0.066** 
(2.27) 
0.123*** 
(3.38) 
0.117*** 
(3.49) 
0.092*** 
(2.77) 
0.110*** 
(3.09) 
0.097*** 
(2.81) 
LEV 
-0.082*** 
(-4.53) 
-0.059*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.087*** 
(-4.59) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.074*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.077*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.083*** 
(-4.59) 
SOE 
-0.008*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.003* 
(-1.87) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.004** 
(-2.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.004 
(-0.74) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.36) 
PPE 
0.056*** 
(3.34) 
0.044*** 
(2.71) 
0.053*** 
(3.23) 
0.041*** 
(2.66) 
0.045*** 
(2.80) 
0.051*** 
(3.12) 
0.049*** 
(2.89) 
0.052*** 
(3.14) 
INTAN 
-0.014 
(-1.24) 
0.005 
(0.34) 
-0.009 
(-1.03) 
0.006 
(0.53) 
0.004 
(0.47) 
0.013 
(1.04) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
0.007 
(0.87) 
SIZE 
0.016*** 
(3.19) 
0.004* 
(1.69) 
0.014*** 
(3.01) 
0.004* 
(1.70) 
0.008** 
(1.99) 
0.012*** 
(2.57) 
0.007* 
(1.78) 
0.010** 
(2.26) 
GROWTH 
0.012*** 
(2.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
0.013*** 
(3.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.57) 
0.010*** 
(2.71) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
0.011** 
(2.78) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
AGE 
0.006** 
(2.04) 
-0.003* 
(-1.69) 
0.004** 
(2.01) 
-0.003* 
(-1.69) 
0.004* 
(1.89) 
0.002* 
(1.63) 
0.005* 
(1.90) 
0.003* 
(1.67) 
Constant 
-0.154*** 
(-7.46) 
-0.093*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.149*** 
(-5.96) 
-0.102*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.105*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.134*** 
(-4.97) 
-0.124*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.141*** 
(-5.09) 
Year and Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Adj.R2 0.167 0.144 0.186 0.172 0.143 0.159 0.140 0.151 
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sample Size 3068 3106 3064 3110 3057 3117 3057 3117 
Chow-test 3.39* 2.21 2.91* 2.04 
Note. The sample group whose POWER_avg value is larger than the industry median is identified as 
the strong control rights group, otherwise it is identified as the weak control rights group. The value in 
the brackets are the T value of regression coefficient, which have controlled the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation problems after the White (1980) robustness correctness and Cluster adjustment; ***, **, 
* respectively indicating the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level (two tailed test). 
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4.3.2 Other Robustness Analyses 
In addition to the above tests, this study completed the following robustness analyses: 1) the specific 
construction method of the control rights variables of the executives might affect the empirical results. 
So based on the initial data of POWER variable, this paper makes ranking grouping according to the 
principle of from small to large (ten groups in total), using the serial number after ranking the value of 
the POWER index; 2) The role that the executives play on the enterprises’ business behavior has the 
characteristics of continuity and accumulation, the CEO who just took the office not long ago usually is 
in the stage of getting familiar with the business, so the company’s financial strategies at that time may 
not be a good presentation of the characteristics of the manager. So this paper eliminated the samples 
whose CEOs changed in that year; 3) Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) think that using various indexes to 
measure the degree of tax avoidance may strengthen the robustness of the research. Borrowing the 
methods of other scholars and combining the practice of tax collection and administration in China, the 
paper adopts the effective tax rate method as an alternative method to measure the tax avoidance 
behavior. After adjustment of the above research variables or samples, we make regression test of the 
relevant models again. We find that the main empirical findings are basically consistent with the 
previous ones and no results which are contradictory to the previous empirical evidence are found. 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This paper takes manufacturing companies in China’s A-share market from 2008 to 2016 as the 
research samples and carries out the empirical analysis. The research finds that the relationship-based 
transactions of the enterprises with the suppliers and clients improve company’s aggressive tax 
avoidance level. The enhancement of control rights of executives further strengthens the positive 
relationship between relationship-based transactions and aggressive tax avoidance behavior. When 
company faces with fierce market competitive pressures and with lower degree of diversification, 
relationship-based transactions boosts aggressive tax avoidance. However, the original positive 
moderating effect of the executives weakness considerably.  
Based on the institutional background of transitional economy, our research result has important 
theoretical and policy implications for clarifying the governance of relationship-based transactions and 
internal right allocation of the Chinese listed companies. Firstly, firms that depend on 
relationship-based transactions prefer to choose aggressive tax avoidance policies. This shows that the 
making of the enterprises’ decisions should take the benefit appeals of the non-financial stakeholders 
into consideration. Secondly, one of the obligations of the board of directors is to construct an effective 
benefit mechanism among various stakeholders so as to stimulate their willingness to participate in 
more efficient mutual governance of the firms. Thirdly, the research finds that the maintenance of 
relationship contract might become a tool for powerful executives to seek personal benefits through the 
guise of tax avoidance. Then how to use various kinds of supervision methods and stimulation 
measures by various means to restrain the diverse and secret financial behavior of senior managers will 
become the focus of the issues in the company governance reform. Finally, this paper also finds that the 
market competitions and professionalization operation orientation might suppress the power 
rent-seeking motivations of executives in tax avoidance decisions, which shows that we should further 
cultivate suitably competitive market environment and correctly estimate the heterogeneous impact of 
the operation patterns of the firms on the efficiency of relationship governance, and to consolidate the 
competition advantages of company by the highly effective coupling of internal and external 
governance mechanisms. 
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Another contribution of our research to the literature is illustrating the influence that relationship-based 
transactions has on corporate tax avoidance strategies and the possible roles senior manager’s control 
rights play in this process. The paper enriches Higgins’ (2015) empirical study on firms’ business 
strategy and tax avoidance decisions in the context of the transitional Chinese institution, and provides 
empirical evidence in support of the Managerial Power Theory proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2002), with 
the example of specific financial decision of tax avoidance. In addition, it is conducive to 
understanding how internal governance and arrangement of Chinese firms influence economic realities 
of relationship-based transactions, and provides clearer evidence to optimizing the current 
co-governance model of stakeholders and strengthening the financial decision supervision of senior 
managers. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The statistics of State Administration of Taxation shows that China’s Anti-tax avoidance work 
contributed 52.3 billion Yuan and 58 billion Yuan to the national tax collection in 2014 and in 2015, 
respectively. Besides, according to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), “tax avoidance is the contentious 
variable from the clear and legal transaction to more aggressive tax avoidance form”, so the scope of 
aggressive tax avoidance is wide and belongs to generalized tax avoidance behavior. Since the theme of 
this paper is to study the tax bearing reduction behavior of firms, and not pay attention to the legality, 
so if there is no special illustration, the expression of tax collection avoidance and aggressive tax 
bearing reduction, will be used alternatively and the differentiation of the concepts will not be made. 
Note 2. The high professional title refers to senior engineer, senior architect, senior accountant, senior 
economist, certified public accountant, certified assets estimator, lawyer, professor, researcher; highly 
educated degree refers to post-graduate and above. 
Note 3. Borrowing the relevant study, the paper’s identifying the political connection is based on 
whether the CEO is the current government official. 
Note 4. The secondary classification standard of China Securities Regulatory Commission for the 
manufacturing industry is adopted. 
Note 5. In order to make it convenient to make comparison with the previous results, only the 
RBT_Supply result is shown here. The test results indicate that the index difference of executive control 
right doesn’t have substantial influence on the conclusion. Therefore, only the executive control right 
results of POWER_avg are shown here. 
 
 
 
